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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans ce papier, nous estimons un modèle dynamique de promotion où la notion d'effet 
causal (causal fast track) est différenciée de la notion non-causale (spurious fast track). 
La probabilité de promotion est fonction du niveau hiérarchique dans la firme, des 
attributs observables et non observables des individus, des attributs observables (et 
dynamiques) de la firme (tels que les profits et la taille), ainsi que de l'historique 
(endogène) des promotions passées mesuré par la rapidité moyenne de promotion. Le 
modèle est appliqué à un échantillon de 30 000 cadres du secteur privé américain, 
travaillant pour plus de 380 grandes firmes. Les résultats indiquent que le processus 
aléatoire générant les promotions dépend faiblement du niveau de capital humain, et 
très peu de la vitesse passée, mais beaucoup plus des facteurs non observables tels que 
la motivation. Les résultats montrent également qu'il y a une large dispersion dans 
l'effet de la vitesse de promotion sur les promotions futures. Bien que l'effet soit positif 
en moyenne, il est négatif pour une sous-population. De façon générale, l'effet de la 
vitesse passée décroît avec le niveau de capital humain et l'ancienneté dans la firme. 
L'effet négatif de la vitesse de promotion est compatible avec le "principe de Peter", 
souvent mentionné dans la littérature sur la dynamique des promotions. 
 
Mots clés : promotions, tournois, choix discrets dynamiques, économie 
des ressources humaines, effets aléatoires. 
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We formulate an empirical model of promotion with dynamic selfselection where the 
current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual 
human capital, unobserved (to the econometrician) individual specific attributes, time 
varying firm specific variables (firm size and profits) as well as endogenous past 
promotion histories. We examine the causal effect of previous promotion histories (as 
measured by realized speed of promotion) on future promotion outcomes. The model is 
fit on an 8 year panel of promotion histories of 30,000 American executives employed 
in more than 380 different firms. The stochastic process generating promotions is 
weakly correlated with standard human capital endowment variables (age, schooling 
and tenure). It may be viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become 
smaller as an individual moves up in the hierarchy and is primarily explained by 
individual (or firm) specific factors other than measured human capital. We also find 
that, conditional on unobservables, the promotion probability is only mildly enhanced, 
on average, by the speed of promotion achieved in the past (a structural fast track 
effect). However, we find the existence of a relatively high cross-sectional dispersion 
in the effect of past promotion histories and we are able to provide an explanation for 
this relatively high dispersion. In general, the magnitude of the individual specific 
effect of achieved speed of promotion is inversely related to accumulated human 
capital (schooling and tenure). We believe that these findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the signaling aspect of past promotions is stronger for those who are 
less educated and stronger for those who are relatively new in a firm. We also find 
that a negative correlation between current promotion and past speed of promotion 
cannot be ruled out for a portion of the population, and we are able to relate this 
finding to the “Peter Principle”. 
 
Keywords: personnel economics, promotions, dynamic discrete choices, 
random effects. 
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1 Introduction
Personnel economics is one of the fastest growing ﬁelds of modern economics
(Lazear 1999). It concerns the strategies that corporations use in governing
their internal labor markets and the performance incentives created. Be-
cause incentives are promotion-driven to an important extent in corporate
hierarchies, the subject of promotion is one of key importance in personnel
economics. The theoretical connection between promotions and wages ap-
pears in tournament (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Rosen 1986), human capital
(Carmichael 1983 and Prendergast 1993) and learning (Chiappori and Salanie
1999) models. Other recent models incorporate multiple factors, including
learning about workers’ ability over time, acquisition of human capital on-
the-job and job assignments to explain empirical results about wage and
promotion dynamics (Bernhardt 1995 and Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
In recent theoretical models, the link between early career results and sub-
sequent promotions (often referred to as a “fast track” when early promotions
increase the pace of later ones) is a central element. Statistically, the notion
of fast track is equivalent to the existence of serial correlation in individual
promotion histories.1 The potential existence of fast tracks suggests that
the stochastic process that generates promotion outcomes may be inherently
dynamic. Fast tracks are suggested in theoretical work by Bernhardt and by
Gibbons and Waldman. In Bernhardt, ﬁrm’s exploit able workers that are
not identiﬁed as able in the outside labor market. Promotion signals ability
publicly. The workers who get promoted quickly are publicly identiﬁed as
able and are awarded subsequent promotions, even before perhaps more able
workers whose ability remains hidden to the outside labor market. In this
way, fast tracks result, even after controlling for worker ability.
Through a diﬀerent mechanism, fast tracks result in the modeling of Gib-
bons and Waldman even when worker ability is common knowledge. Work-
ers with more innate ability are simply promoted more quickly initially and
spend less time in subsequent levels because of faster growth in their eﬀective
ability. Eﬀective ability is a function of both innate ability and experience.
It is ability, as opposed to asymmetric information regarding ability, which
is creating the fast track.
While most recent inﬂuential contributions to personnel economics remain
1Because of the link between promotion and wage growth, serial correlation in promo-
tion outcomes will typically imply serial correlation in wage growth.
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theoretical, a small but expanding empirical literature on promotions also ex-
ists. As of now, the empirical literature is dominated by studies based on
personnel records of a single ﬁrm. These include papers by Ariga, Ohkusa
and Brunello (1999), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993, 1994a, 1994b),
Chiappori, Salanie and Valentin (1999), Lazear (1992), and Seltzer and Mer-
rett (2000). The promotion-wage growth link is well established in Lazear
(92) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993). Up to now, a major focus
of the empirical literature has been the promotion/wage growth link.2 The
existence of fast tracks has also been investigated empirically. Evidence of
promotion fast tracks was found in Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello’s single-
ﬁrm Japanese study, in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom’s (1994b) study of a
medium sized US service sector ﬁrm and in the Seltzer and Merrett’s study
of the Union Bank of Australia.
Making both theoretical and empirical contributions, Chiappori, Salanie
and Valentin (1999) examine promotions in a large French state-owned ﬁrm
between 1960 and 1982. They develop a testable implication for wage dy-
namics, dubbed the “late beginner” eﬀect, using a model of learning with
downward wage rigidity that does not require observed worker output. They
demonstrate that, conditional on an equal ﬁrst period start-wage and last
period end-wage, the worker who reaches the last-period’s end-wage later in
his career will have the higher expected ability and should have better future
prospects. Chiappori, Salanie and Valentin (1999) ﬁnd empirical support
for this hypothesis. At the same time, without any conditional statement,
they ﬁnd that an “early starter” (i.e., as measured by high early wages) also
enjoys better future prospects.
Finally, promotion dynamics have been analyzed in the sociology and
management literatures.3 Some stylized ﬁndings often cited include: (1) the
importance of early career results on later promotion;4 (2) the importance
2Using thirteen years of personnel records from a large durable goods manufacturer,
Lazear found that the wages of workers fell after spending seven years in the same position,
while job change resulted in higher current wages and later wage growth. Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994,b) found that increasing position tenure and real pay are inversely
related.
3For surveys see Forbes and Piercy (1991) and Rosenbaum (1984).
4Rosenbaum, J. E. (1979) ﬁnds that those promoted ﬁrst were more likely to receive
further promotions and to reach higher levels in the ﬁrm. Howard and Bray (1988) ﬁnd
that Bell System managers with more signiﬁcant job challenges in years one through eight
exhibited greater advancement at year twenty.
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of education and advanced degrees on promotion;5 (3) the importance of
functional area and age in the attainment of a top executive position;6 (4)
the disadvantage faced by new hires.7
Though good descriptive work on ﬁrm hierarchies exists, it is probably
fair to say that the level of sophistication of the empirical work found in
the personnel economics literature is not commensurate with the level of
sophistication of its theoretical foundations. The empirical literature may
be criticized for at least two main reasons. First, as most empirical work
is based on a single ﬁrm, the empirical results that models are being built
around risk being idiosyncratic to the speciﬁc ﬁrms or occupations studied.8
Many of the stylized facts in the literature rely on a hand full of papers
that await corroboration. As a result, and without more extensive studies
using multiple ﬁrms, it is practically impossible to infer whether individual
promotion histories are mostly explained by individual speciﬁc endowments
or by ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Secondly, the literature is largely dominated by empirical strategies aimed
at ﬁnding variables correlated with promotion outcomes. These include rela-
tive in-level wages, time since last promotion and measures of past promotion
achievements. While ﬁnding variables correlated with promotion outcomes
may be a useful step in the comprehension of promotion mechanisms in cor-
porate hierarchies, economists should be reluctant to attribute a causal rela-
tionship between these indicators and promotion outcomes. In other words,
in the presence of dynamic self-selection, the correlation between past promo-
5Howard and Bray (1988) found a college degree to be the best predictor of promotion.
Forbes and Piercy (1991, p. 165) ﬁnd that the time to the CEO position is reduced through
higher levels of education. Useem and Karabel (1986) show the importance of earning a
degree from an elite institution when the executive is not from elite social origins.
6Vroom and MacCrimmon (1968) found that promotion opportunities varied with func-
tional area and were better in ﬁnance and marketing. Forbes and Piercy (1991, p.4) ﬁnd
the functional area backgrounds of CEOs to vary by industry. They also ﬁnd with regards
to eventual CEOs that the time to reach various top positions in the organization varied
by functional area (p.145) and provided evidence of age varying systematically with ca-
reer level (p.144). For example, CEOs reached a top management position by age 47 on
average and none reached this level after age 58. Out of 230 CEOs, none were promoted
to the CEO position later than age 65, the mean age was 50.
7Forbes and Piercy (p.5) note that successful top executives spend most of their careers
within the same ﬁrm. Tuckel and Siegel (1983) ﬁnd most CEOs to have spent their entire
careers within one ﬁrm.
8In one of few multi-ﬁrm studies, Bognanno (2001) investigates implications of tourna-
ment theory using the same US panel data used in this paper.
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tion histories and subsequent promotion outcomes may be highly spurious.9
In the econometric analysis presented here, promotions may be viewed as
a sequence of discrete outcomes driven by observed as well as unobserved (to
the econometrician) individual and ﬁrm characteristics. Statistical analysis
is complicated by the fact that unobserved attributes are career persistent
and that, in a context where employers have imperfect information about
individual workers, past outcomes may be used to “signal” worker ability.
This implies that the serial persistence observed in individual promotion his-
tories may be simultaneously explained by persistent unobserved heterogene-
ity, deemed a non-causal fast track in the sense that rapid promotions them-
selves are not causing subsequent promotions, as well as state dependence
(Heckman 1981). In our analysis, we use the terminology of a“structural
fast track” to refer to the statistical notion of state dependence. A rigorous
analysis therefore requires that the dynamics of the stochastic process gener-
ating promotions and the endogeneity of the initial conditions be taken into
account.
This paper examines the promotion dynamics of American executives
across large corporations. We estimate a dynamic reduced-form model of
career promotion outcomes using an employer-employee panel of 385 of the
largest corporations in the U.S. The paper provides an empirical picture that
it is not idiosyncratic to one or a small group of ﬁrms. However, using data
across ﬁrms comes at the cost of introducing multi-dimensional heterogeneity
which is often not accounted for in applied work. The econometric model
allows for the following features:
 Promotion probabilities are a function of individual observed human
capital endowments (age, schooling and tenure)10;
 Promotion probabilities are potentially aﬀected by ﬁrm size and ﬁrm
proﬁts;
9Recent papers that model dynamic self-selection in human capital accumulation in-
clude Keane and Wolpin (1997), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Belzil and Hansen (2002),
in a structural framework and Cameron and Heckman (1998 and 2001) in a reduced-form
framework.
10While it is widely recognized that the more educated also experience higher wage
growth, the causal eﬀect of schooling on post schooling human capital investments is
rarely investigated. However, as we allow education to allow for promotions in the present
framework, we implicitely allow schooling to aﬀect wage growth.
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 Promotion probabilities are potentially aﬀected by past promotion his-
tories and, more precisely, by the speed of promotion achieved up to
the present period (the notion of a structural fast track)
 Promotion probabilities are potentially aﬀected by the current level,
given individual speciﬁc endowments;
 Promotion probabilities are aﬀected by time persistent individual un-
observed factors such as abilities, motivation as well as ﬁrm speciﬁc
unobserved factors (the notion of a non-causal fast track);
 Both the initial speed of promotion and the initial level in the ﬁrm
(measured at the start of the sampling period) are endogenous. They
are aﬀected by individual unobserved heterogeneity correlated with un-
observed heterogeneity aﬀecting promotion outcomes;
 The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to depend on
the number of sampling periods each individual is observed. This allows
us to control for panel attrition bias which could arise in the presence
of endogenous mobility or other sampling problems.
After a thorough review of the empirical literature, we can assert that
our model is the most general and most comprehensive empirical model of
promotion dynamics ever estimated. This econometric structure allows us to
answer the following fundamental questions:
1. Are promotion histories signiﬁcantly aﬀected by standard human cap-
ital endowment variables (age, tenure and education)?
2. Do promotion probabilities diﬀer with the executive’s level in the hier-
archy?
3. Are promotion histories signiﬁcantly aﬀected by persistent individual
unobserved factors?
4. What is the causal eﬀect of having achieved a higher rate of promotion
since entering the labor market on subsequent promotion probabilities?
5. Is the causal eﬀect of past promotion histories characterized by a sub-
stantial level of heterogeneity?
7
6. What is the relative importance of individual speciﬁc factors (such as
human capital) and promotion dynamics in explaining diﬀerences in
career promotions?
7. Are promotion dynamics correlated with individual speciﬁc attributes
such as education and tenure?
We believe that answering these questions is a major undertaking and
will shed light on one of the most crucial aspects of personnel economics;
that is the determinants of promotion dynamics. In particular, our analysis
will allow us to distinguish between a structural (or causal) fast track eﬀect,
as opposed to fast tracks explained by unobserved persistent factors.
Our results point out to the complexity of the stochastic process which
governs ﬁrm level transitions. We ﬁnd that among standard individual spe-
ciﬁc human capital endowment variables (tenure and schooling), only school-
ing really matters. The stochastic process generating promotions may be
viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become smaller as an
individual move up in the hierarchy and which are primarily explained by
unobserved (to the econometrician) individual (or ﬁrm) speciﬁc factors other
than measured human capital.
Our results have also allowed us to uncover the dynamic aspects of pro-
motion histories. While the theoretical literature reserves a central place for
the notion of a fast track, we ﬁnd that the stochastic process generating pro-
motions is only mildly positively correlated (structurally), on average, with
the speed of promotion achieved in the past. However, we ﬁnd the existence
of a relatively high cross-sectional dispersion in the eﬀect of past promotion
histories (speed of promotion) and we are able to provide an explanation for
this relatively high dispersion. In general, the magnitude of the individual
speciﬁc eﬀect of achieving a higher speed of promotion is inversely related to
accumulated human capital; that is it is negatively correlated with schooling
and tenure. We believe that these ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that the signaling aspect of past promotions is stronger for those who are less
educated and who are relatively new in a ﬁrm. Accumulated schooling and
tenure may reduce the risk associated with promotion (from the perspective
of the ﬁrm), and may therefore lead ﬁrms to ignore past histories. We also
ﬁnd that a negative correlation between current promotion and past speed
of promotion cannot be ruled out of for a portion of the population, and
we are able to relate this ﬁnding to the famous “Peter Principle” (Lazear,
forthcoming).
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The remaining sections of the paper are structured according to the fol-
lowing format. Section 2 describes the panel data that we use. The econo-
metric strategy is discussed in Section 3 and the econometric model is laid
out in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the presentation of the results. In
Section 6, we discuss brieﬂy an alternative model speciﬁcation in which pop-
ulation heterogeneity is aﬀected by accumulated human capital. Concluding
remarks are found in section 7. Finally, various summary statistics are found
in the Appendix (Section 8).
2 The Data
The panel data set analyzed in this paper contains 32,890 executives working
at 385 of the largest ﬁrms in the United States during the period from 1981
to 1988. These data were obtained by the Center for Advanced Human
Resources Studies at Cornell University.11 All of these executives appear in
at least two consecutive years while 20,990 are in the data for three years,
14,427 for four years, 8971 for ﬁve years, 4967 for six years, 2964 for seven
years and 1619 for eight years.
In order to belong to our sample, the executives had to meet the following
conditions: 1) as our focus is on promotion, only executives appearing in at
least two consecutive years are kept for analysis; 2) only executives who are
ﬁrst observed no more than six levels beneath the CEO are kept for analysis.
Executives seven or more levels from the CEO position are relatively few
in number and provide a thin basis on which to extrapolate, as is evident
in Table A2. The database reveals information on individual, job and ﬁrm
characteristics, including age, education, functional area, job title, tenure,
base pay, bonus pay, reporting level, industry, ﬁrm proﬁts, sales, and em-
ployment. Executives in the data range in position from the CEO down to
regional sales executives, production superintendents, and plant managers.
These are the most common job titles six levels below the CEO.
One advantage of these data over other datasets that have been used
to study promotion is that we do not rely on changes in the job code that
result in higher consequent pay or movement up an empirically determined
job ladder to determine whether a promotion has taken place. Each individ-
ual’s job level, the number of reporting levels from the CEO position (level
1), is provided by each ﬁrm annually, unlike in some other papers where it
11Additional description of the data may be found in Bognanno (2001).
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must be empirically determined. Promotion in this study reﬂects an upward
movement in the ﬁrm’s hierarchy.
Two tables, found in the Appendix, provide insight into the data. The
ﬁrst ﬁve sets of variables in Table A1 pertain to the number of consecutive
years an executive of level 7 or higher appears in the data. Attrition is partly
due to ﬁrms failing to report individuals but mostly due to ﬁrms leaving the
survey. Due to the occurrence of promotions, executives in the data longer
tend to be observed at slightly higher levels in the ﬁrms. Executives in their
ﬁrst observation have an average age of 46 years and average education of
16.4 years. Only 3.5% of executives were newcomers to their ﬁrms in the year
they were ﬁrst observed in the data. Seventeen percent of executives were
employed in ﬁnance positions, 14.5% were in marketing, 13.8% were proﬁt
center heads, and 12.4% held manufacturing positions. Seventy-four percent
of the executives were employed in manufacturing ﬁrms. Overall, promotions
are relatively rare events. The average number of promotions per individual
and per year is 0.11 (Table A1).
Table A2 provides more detail on promotion, it shows the fraction of
executives promoted between their ﬁrst and second years in the data by
level, as well as tenure and age by level. It is clear from Table A2 that the
rate of promotion diminishes at higher levels in the hierarchy of the ﬁrm. For
instance, a level 5 executive enjoys a 15% probability of promotion annually,
where for a level 3 executive, the rate is only 4.3%. Across all levels, for
executives in their ﬁrst two years in the data, the rate of promotion is 11.7%.
To the extent that promotion is a rare event, it is more so the case for senior
executives.
3 Econometric Strategy
As a starting point, we consider the estimation of a dynamic promotion
probability model, which ideally, would be of the following form
Pr(Yijt = 1) = F (i,j , Yijt−1, Yij,t−2...Yijt−p, Lijt0)
where Yijt is an indicator recording the event of a promotion for individual
i in ﬁrm j at time t, i and j are individual and ﬁrm speciﬁc relevant
attributes, Lijt0 is the starting level (at time t0) and (Yijt−1, Yij,t−2...Yijt−p)
is a p dimensional vector of relevant past promotion outcomes. In order to
implement such a model, we have to address three speciﬁc problems. One
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problem is how to summarize the entire vector of past promotion histories in
a reasonable way. The second issue relates to the identiﬁcation of individual
and ﬁrm speciﬁc unobserved characteristics. Finally, we also face the usual
dilemma faced by those estimating dynamic discrete choice models, namely
whether to use conditional maximum likelihood techniques (sometimes re-
ferred to as ﬁxed eﬀects estimation) or use a random eﬀect speciﬁcation.
These issues deserve some discussion.
First, with respect to the modeling of promotion dynamics, it should
be recalled that in the econometric literature devoted to the estimation of
dynamic logit models with ﬁxed eﬀects (Chamberlain, 1984 and Magnac,
2000), it is pointed out that non-parametric identiﬁcation of two lags re-
quires at least seven periods. However, the empirical literature suggests that
the role of past promotions goes substantially beyond lags of order two or
three. In actual internal labor markets, the promotion cycle is likely to be
relatively long, perhaps 7 years as pointed out by Lazear, 1992. Therefore,
it would not be realistic to estimate a model that restricted the number of
lags is restricted to two or three.12 For this reason, we disregard the short
run dimension of promotion dynamics, and focus on a summary of all past
promotion outcomes.
Ideally, we would like a measure of past histories that embodies the signal
provided to the labor market regarding the caliber of the executive. The the-
oretical literature considers the importance of the signal provided by initial
promotion, assuming a common starting level. Were the initial placement
levels considered as well as promotions, the importance of this signal would
be just as relevant. Our measure should therefore be capturing the eﬀect
of early promotion history as well as the level of the initial placement in
the ﬁrm’s hierarchy. In order to capture both aspects, we deﬁne a speed of
promotion variable (referred to as Speed below) which is measured as the
ratio of the level an executive has risen to by the start of the sample to
the executive’s years of labor market experience. With level 1 representing
12To see this argument, consider estimating a model where the current promotion prob-
ability depends on the past two or three promotion outcomes. These parameter estimates
would turn out the be negative and would imply that simulated promotion histories entail
penalizing executives who have been promoted during the sampling period. Indeed, we
have veriﬁed this assertion by estimating a dynamic promotion model where current pro-
motions depend on up to 3 or 4 past promotion outcomes. All parameters turn out to be
negative, although those pertaining to order 3 and order 4 were much weaker (very close
to 0).
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CEO’s, levels fall with promotions and higher initial assignments. Since it is
intuitively easier to think of promotion speed as a positive number, we look
at the level an executive has risen to at the start of the sample in reference
to level 12, the lowest level reported in the data. The reference level chosen
is irrelevant as it changes the number of levels an executive has risen equally
across executives. If we were to measure the speed of promotion only by
considering the number of promotions, those who entered at a higher level
would have fewer promotions due to starting closer to the top of their hier-
archies. As such, we would then be confounding those executives with those
who started beneath and have a lower promotion probability.
The distinction between individual and ﬁrm speciﬁc attributes is also
problematic, given the structure of the sample data. While it is possible to
observe a few ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (to be discussed below), the movement
of executives between ﬁrms cannot be observed in the data set that we use.
Therefore, the data do not allow us to identify the ﬁrm speciﬁc unobserved
term from the individual speciﬁc term, unlike what is done in Abowd, Kra-
marz and Margolies (1999) and Belzil (2000).13 Without loss of generality,
we therefore refer to the unobserved factors as individual speciﬁc.
Finally, with respect to estimation issues, our choice of an economet-
ric estimation technique is largely dictated by the need to allow for multi-
dimensional population heterogeneity in promotion dynamics. Our analysis,
as are most microeconometric analyses, is plagued by the presence of un-
observed individual and ﬁrm factors. For this reason, the eﬀects of past
promotions may hardly be seen as a single parameter. Indeed, in many areas
of microeconometrics, classical models in which marginal eﬀects are summa-
rized by a single parameter are gradually being replaced by more general
models with slopes as well as intercepts that are observation speciﬁc.14 In
order to assess the relevance of theoretical models predicting positive pro-
motion dynamics, we need to recover the marginal eﬀects associated with
the variable capturing the eﬀect of past promotion and, ultimately, compare
them to the marginal eﬀects of variables such as education and tenure. A
key objective is therefore to recover the population distribution of individ-
ual speciﬁc promotion dynamics parameters. For these main reasons, we
13In these papers, identiﬁcation is rendered possible by a relatively small number of
individuals observed, at diﬀerent points in time, in two or more ﬁrms.
14Recent papers, including Alvarez, Browning and Ejrnaes (2003), have pointed out the
particular need for multi-dimensional heterogeneity in the modeling of earnings growth.
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focus on random eﬀect estimation techniques.15 While random eﬀects tech-
niques require a speciﬁcation of the initial conditions of the stochastic process
analyzed and are often implemented in a fully parametric framework, we pro-
pose a random eﬀect estimation strategy based on ﬂexible (semi-parametric)
methods. We use a ﬁnite mixture model in order to characterize the distri-
bution of individual speciﬁc intercepts and slopes.16 This approach allows
us to minimize the impact of distributional assumptions needed in order to
implement such a model.
4 Econometric Model
In this section, we present the econometric model. Modeling promotion dy-
namics requires i) the deﬁnition of a promotion, ii) a parametric form for the
promotion probability and, in particular, the allowance for the dependence
of current promotion on endogenous past promotion histories, iii) the role of
unobserved heterogeneity, iv) a deﬁnition of the initial conditions’ distribu-
tion, namely the initial speed of promotion achieved or the rank level in the
ﬁrm at the start of the sampling period.
4.1 The Deﬁnition of a Promotion
The aim of the model is to make inference about individual promotion his-
tories from a sequence of rank levels (within a ﬁrm) occupied by individuals.
The sequence contains up to 8 years of data. We deﬁne a promotion as a
negative change in level (an accession to a higher rank in the hierarchy); that
is
Yijt = 1(Lijt − Lijt−1 < 0) (1)
15One of the advantages of conditional likelihood techniques is the fact that statistical
inference may be achieved without having to specify a distribution for the individual spe-
ciﬁc eﬀects, including the initial conditions. However, the conditional approach precludes
the estimation of time invariant regressors such as schooling, and does not allow one to
recover the marginal eﬀects.
16This approach is also common in empirical dynamic programming models with un-
observed heterogeneity (Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999, Belzil and
Hansen, 2002). It is largely inﬂuenced by the estimation method proposed by Heckman
and Singer, 1984.
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where Lijt is the rank of individual i, in ﬁrm j, at time t and 1(.) is the
indicator function.17 In total, this results in 7 potential promotion outcomes
per individual. We do not distinguish between demotions and absence of
promotions.18 Similarly, we do not make the distinction between promotions
for more than 1 level (a rare event) and standard promotions taking place
when an individual reaches the next level. Promotion is coded as a binary
variable. A promotion of one or more levels is coded as a one. A demotion
or unchanged level is recorded as a zero. In order to minimize the impact
of measurement error, if the level in the year subsequent to a promotion
reﬂects a demotion, the original improvement in level is regarded as a coding
error and no promotion is recorded. This means that we do not code as
promotions improvements in level that last just one year. Similarly, if a
worker is a demoted in one year and promoted in the next to the original
level, this return to the original level is not recorded as a promotion. Last,
promotions are only registered when they constitute an improvement over the
workers initial level in the data. This ensures that promotions register only
when they constitute a net upward movement over the span of observations
and not just upward movement over the previous year.
4.2 The Promotion Probability
The basic element of our econometric strategy is the following promotion
probability
Pr(Yijt = 1) = Λ(βX ·Xit−1 + βW ·Wjt−1 (2)
+βL6 · L6it−1 + ...βL2 · L2it−1 + βPi · Speedit−1 + αpi )
where
 Xit represents a vector of individual speciﬁc attributes (education, tenure
in the ﬁrm, an indicator, newcomer, for which 1 signiﬁes that the execu-
tive is in the ﬁrst year of employment with the ﬁrm and age measured at
17The reader should remember that a smaller number for the level variable (Lijt) implies
a higher rank.
18Making the distinction would require the use of an ordered model. We initally exper-
imented with this possibility, but estimation was rendered diﬃcult by the low incidence of
demotions.
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the initial sample period). Of those variables, only tenure is time vary-
ing. To achieve as much ﬂexibility as possible, the education variable
may be transformed into several class variables. These are i) those who
have obtained a high school degree or less (12 years or less), ii) those
who have attended some post high school training (13 to 15 years), iii)
college graduates (16 years), iv) those who have obtained 17 or 18 years
and v) those who had 19 years or more. The high school graduates and
drop-outs are the reference group.
 Wjt represents a vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc time varying variables reﬂecting
levels and the changes in variables such as ﬁrm size (employment) and
proﬁts. As a promotion is deﬁned as the change in level from t−1 to t,
proﬁts and employment are the average values of the current and the
previous period changes.19 Proﬁts are measured in millions of 1980 US
dollars. Firm size is measured in thousands of employees. Employment
changes are calculated as the percentage over the previous year.
 L6, ...L2 are endogenous time varying binary indictors equal to 1 if the
individual is at the rank level indicated by the subscript and 0 if not.
Level 7 is the reference group. Level 1 (CEO) is not included because
CEO’s cannot be promoted.
 Speedit measures the speed of promotion achieved up to date t. It is
calculated as the ratio of the number of levels reached at any point in
time (in reference to level 12) and the diﬀerence between age and years
of education (minus 5). It is meant to capture the structural fast track
hypothesis. As individuals are observed over the sampling period, the
speed of promotion is adjusted according to the following law of motion
speedit =
#levelst−1 + Yit
(aget−1 − educ− 5) + 1
Note that we assume that the parameter space of the individual speciﬁc
parameters, βSi , is unrestricted. This means that, as such, negative structural
fast tracks, are not ruled out. One reason for not restricting the parameter
space is that we certainly do not want to rule out the possibility that the
19This type of smoothing is common in the empirical literature on worker reallocation
(see Belzil, 2000, for an example).
15
mean of βSi is 0 in the population. If we restricted the parameters to be
positive valued, this would most likely have a key impact on the estimated
distribution of βSi . Another reason is that a negative fast track, at least
for a certain fraction of the population, may be explained economically (see
Section 5.1.2).
 αi is an individual (or perhaps ﬁrm) speciﬁc unobserved termwhich rep-
resents individual unobserved heterogeneity such as unobserved skills
and motivation or unobserved diﬀerences in ﬁrm structures. It is de-
tailed below.
 The promotion probabilities are assumed to be logistic; that is
Λ(.) = exp(.)
1 + exp(.)
(3)
Conditional on unobserved individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity,
the promotion outcomes are assumed to be independent.
 (βx, βW , βL6..βL2) are parameters to be estimated and αpi and βPi are
individual speciﬁc unobserved terms with distribution functions that
have to be estimated (approximated).
4.3 The Initial Condition Problem
In order to resolve the initial condition problem, we formulate a model for the
initial speed of promotion. Our solution is therefore in the spirit of Heckman,
1981. The alternative approach is to deﬁne the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity term(s) conditional on the initial conditions.20
We assume that the initial speed of promotion achieved by an individual
(by the start of the sampling period) is represented by a linear regression
function. That is
speedit0 = X
s
it0
· δ + αsi + εit0 (4)
20This entails writing αpi = αp0i + αP1 ∗ speedit0 and βSi = βS0i + βS1 · speedit0 where αp0i
and βD0i are the residual parts of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, assumed to be
orthogonal to the initial speed of promotion (speedit0).
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where speedit0 is the initial speed, X
s
it0
is a set of regressors containing ed-
ucation and age, and where εit0 is i.i.d. Normal with mean 0 and variance
σ2S. As many individuals have started with a diﬀerent ﬁrm, we cannot re-
ally condition on tenure. So only age and education are used as regressors.
The endogeneity of the initial speed of promotion is taken into account in
the model by assuming that unobserved heterogeneity aﬀecting the current
level reached by an individual, αsi , is correlated with αPi . Note that we are
implicitly assuming that conditioning on αsi is suﬃcient to estimate the level
speciﬁc eﬀects. This assumption appears reasonable as the measured speed
of promotion and the initial level are closely correlated.
4.4 Endogenous Sampling and Attrition
A striking feature of our data is the relatively wide range in the number
of times individuals are reported. As it is impossible to rule out attrition
bias or endogenous reporting by the ﬁrm, we recognize that the distribu-
tion of unobservable promotability (αpi ) is not necessarily orthogonal to the
frequency at which individuals are reported. To resolve this problem, we
interpret the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity as conditional on the
number of time an individual is reported.21 We assume that
αSi = αS0i + αS2 ·Ni (5)
αpi = αp0i + αP2 ·Ni (6)
and
βPi = βP0i + βP2 ·Ni (7)
where Ni is a measure of imbalance in the panel. Typically, Ni is the number
of times an individual is reported by its ﬁrm or, alternatively, it is a set of
binary variables which exhaust all the possible number of transitions reported
(2 to 7).
21Conditioning on number of observations in order to resolve initial condition problems
is discussed in Wooldridge (2003).
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4.5 The Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity
Our estimation method is based on the premise that αp0i, βS0i and αS0i are
jointly distributed according to an unknown cumulative distribution function,
H(.), which is approximated using a multivariate discrete distribution of the
form:
Pr(αp0i = αp0k, βS0i = βS0k,αS0i = αS0k) = pk
where k = 1, ..K. The number of types, K, is assumed to be known, although
it is the outcome of various experimentations.
The type probability, pk, is estimated using a logistic transform, that is
pk =
exp(δk)
exp(δ0) + .. exp(δK)
(8)
with the obvious restriction that probabilities sum up to 1.
4.6 The Likelihood Function
The likelihood function represents the joint probability of the speed of pro-
motion already achieved at the beginning of the sampling period and the
sequence of promotion outcomes observed until the end of the panel. As the
panel data cover eight years, we therefore have a maximum of seven poten-
tial promotion outcomes per individual. Theoretically, obtaining parameter
estimates requires the maximization of the following log likelihood function,
Li;
Li = log{
¦ 1
σL
.φ(Lit0 −X
S
it0
· δ − αSi0
σL
).Pr(Yij1...Yij7;αPi0, βPi0)·dH(αSi0,αPi0,βPi0)}
(9)
where Pr(Yij1...Yij7) is the joint probability of the observed promotion out-
comes. However, in practice, the objective function is a discrete approxima-
tion (a weighted sum) of (8), where the weights are given by the population
proportion deﬁned in (7).
Li = log{
Kz
k=1
pk ·
1
σL
.φ(Lit0 −Xit0 · δ − α
S
0k
σL
).Pr(Yij1...Yij7;αP0k,βP0k)} (10)
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4.7 An Overview of the Model Speciﬁcations
The results presented below represent only a portion of the empirical work
that we have done over the course of this project. We have worked with
various model speciﬁcations. Basically, the speciﬁcations diﬀer in terms of
the treatment of the initial conditions as well as in terms of the treatment of
the education variable. Finally, as the number of types (K) is not formally
estimated, we experimented with diﬀerent numbers of types.
First, with respect to the treatment of initial conditions, all model spec-
iﬁcations reported in the following sections have also been carried out in a
framework where the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is conditional
on the initial condition (the initial speed of promotion). The details of the
estimation procedure are found in footnote 17. As all fundamental results,
especially those related to the promotion dynamics and the marginal eﬀects,
were comparable, we report the results of the model where the initial condi-
tion is actually modeled.22
With respect to the choice of variables, we consider two versions of the
model. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we condition on schooling and assume that
schooling is exogenous. In a random eﬀect structure such as the one esti-
mated here, exogeneity implies, among other things, that the distribution of
the unobservable factor is orthogonal to schooling. This assumption is ques-
tionable. In an eﬀort to minimize the number of unduly strong assumptions,
we re-estimated the model while omitting schooling explicitly (therefore in-
cluding it implicitly in the individual speciﬁc unobserved term). In such a
framework, only tenure and age are forced to be orthogonal to the individual
eﬀects. These assumptions are certainly less controversial. Both versions are
found in the empirical result sections below.
Finally, with respect to the number of types used to estimate the mixture
models, all estimates reported herein are for the case with four types. Going
up to six types turned out to be unproductive as all the basic results (mean,
variance and correlations) may be illustrated with 4 types.
22For those interested, the other estimates may be found in a companion working paper
(Belzil and Bognanno, 2004).
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5 Models with Heterogeneous Promotion Dy-
namics
In this section, we ﬁrst present the parameter estimates obtained from both
model speciﬁcations (with and without education). These are found in Sec-
tion 5.1. In order to illustrate the results, we present the marginal eﬀects
corresponding to the main parameters of the model (promotion dynamics,
education, age and tenure) and discuss their relative magnitude (in Section
5.2). Finally, using a variance decomposition of the index function, we illus-
trate the relative importance of unobserved factors.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates are found in Table 1. The ﬁrst column is devoted
to the model that estimates the eﬀect of education (Model 1). The second
contains estimates for the case in which education is part of the unobserved
heterogeneity term (Model 2). For both models, the estimates related to the
initial condition (the initial speed of promotion) are found in the upper part
while those related to the promotion probabilities are in the lower part. At
the outset, and as indicated by the asymptotic standard errors, it should be
noted that virtually all parameters are estimated very precisely. This is a
reﬂection of the relatively large number of individuals and periods available
in the data. Both models are estimated for the case where K=4 (four types
of executives).
5.1.1 Model with Exogenous Education
The set of estimates for the initial condition equation indicates that the
initial speed of promotion decreases with age (-0.0127), and increases with
schooling (the estimates range from 0.5751 for those who have attended col-
lege to 0.6811 for those who have 19 years or more). With regards to age,
this result is expected because younger workers are at a stage in their career
where promotions are more likely. With regards to schooling, the results
are consistent with both the more educated being promoted more frequently
and beginning at a higher initial level. The estimates for the type speciﬁc
intercept terms (αS
0k) range from 0.8839 (type 1) to approximately 0.32 (for
type2, type 3 and type 4), suggesting that the marginal distribution of the
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individual speciﬁc term of the initial promotion speed equation may be sum-
marized by two types. Obviously, executives of type 1 are those who have
achieved a greater speed of promotion by the start of the sampling period.
The correlation between this individual speciﬁc term and other heterogeneity
components of the model are analyzed below.
Turning to the estimates of the promotion probability equation, found in
the lower part of Table 1, we ﬁnd that unobserved heterogeneity (αP
0i) plays
an important role as it is possible to identify 4 distinct types; type 1, which
corresponds to 23% of the population, has a higher promotion probability
(with an intercept of -1.3496) while type 4 individuals (27% of the population)
have the lowest promotion probability (with an intercept of -2.9332). It is
relatively clear that, given age and education, those who have achieved a
higher speed of promotion initially (type 1) are also those who tend to be
more likely to be promoted subsequently. A more formal analysis may be
performed using various summary statistics of the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity (mean, variance and correlations), found in Tables 3 ,4 and 5.
Indeed, the implied correlation between unobserved promotability and the
initial speed of promotion (between αP
0i and αS0i) is equal to 0.91 (Table 4).
It is also important to note that, after conditioning on unobserved hetero-
geneity and age, the eﬀect of tenure tends to be very small. The parameter
estimate for tenure is negative (-0.0029). The relatively small magnitude of
the parameter (to be discussed below in conjunction with marginal eﬀects), is
most likely explained by the relatively high dispersion in the intercept terms
and suggests that, given unobservable factors, how long one has served in
the ﬁrm is practically irrelevant for the purpose of predicting promotion out-
comes. However, newcomers to the ﬁrm have a lower promotion probability.
This is not surprising. We also ﬁnd that promotion probabilities increase
with age (0.0172). However, as we are conditioning on tenure and level in
the ﬁrm, the positivity of the parameter estimate is not inconsistent with the
negativity of the eﬀect of age on the initial speed of promotion.
Among the standard human capital variables used in the empirical liter-
ature, schooling appears to be the only one aﬀecting promotion outcomes.
Assuming exogeneity of the education variable with respect to the stochastic
process generating promotions, the schooling binary variables, ranging be-
tween 0.0147 and 0.3074, indicate clearly that schooling increases promotion
(except for schooling levels exceeding 18 years). The positive eﬀect of edu-
cation on promotion outcomes is certainly consistent with the steeper slope
of age earnings proﬁle of the more educated.
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In our analysis, ﬁrm proﬁts and size, along with their changes, are the only
ﬁrm variables included. We include them in order to have additional control
variables for unmeasured ﬁrm factors and but we do not really focus on ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Indeed, ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity cannot be distinguished
from individual unobserved heterogeneity. As is clear from the results, they
play practically no role in the promotion process. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of
ﬁrm size and proﬁts on promotion are negative (-0.0015 and -0.0001) and very
small, although ﬁrm size is relatively precisely estimated. This may reﬂect
the fact that, other things equal, promotions are more likely in smaller ﬁrms.
The eﬀects of ﬁrm employment changes and proﬁt changes are even smaller.
They may indicate that the promotion process of American executives is not
sensitive to the business cycle.
We also ﬁnd evidence that promotion outcomes are largely dependent on
the current level of the manager. The rank speciﬁc dummies (ranging from
-0.13 at rank 6 to -2.65 at rank 2) indicate that given all individual and ﬁrm
speciﬁc endowments, promotion probabilities become smaller as one reaches
higher ranks. The average promotion probabilities per level, are found in
Table 6. They indicate that, although the average promotion probability is
around 0.12, the level speciﬁc average probabilities range from 0.23 (level 7)
to 0.02 (level 2).
As indicated in Section 3 and Section 4, the distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity is understood to be conditional on the number of times an in-
dividual is observed. As may be seen from the results, there is some evidence
that the per-period promotion probability is smaller for those individuals for
whom we have more observations. The eﬀect (-0.0040) is however small. At
this stage, it is diﬃcult to give a clear interpretation of this result. The re-
porting frequency imbalances may well be explained by a diversity of factors
such as outside mobility or inconsistent reporting by ﬁrms.23
Given the focus of this paper, those estimates that generate the most
interest pertain to the eﬀects of the speed of promotion on promotion out-
comes. As is clear from the speed of promotion equation in Section 4.2, the
speed of promotion variable is taking into account early career promotions
as well as promotions taking place during the sample period. As it was the
case for the promotion probability intercept terms, there is substantial het-
erogeneity in the slope parameters. There are four distinct types identiﬁed
23We have also estimated the model without conditioning on observation frequency and
found very similar results.
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in the data. Type 1 individuals, endowed with a high promotion probability,
have a slope nearly equal to 0 (namely -0.0046). On the other hand, those of
types, endowed with lower promotion probabilities, are endowed with posi-
tive slopes. When averaged over all four types, the eﬀect of past speed of
promotion is 0.20 (see Table 3). This means that, on average, there exists a
structural positive fast track. However, for 23% of the population (type 1),
current promotion probabilities are independent of past promotion histories.
In other words, type 1 individuals achieved more frequent promotions but do
not derive advantages from their promotion histories.24 These results sug-
gest a negative correlation between the propensity to be promoted and the
existence of a structural fast track.
In general, we observe that cross sectional diﬀerences in promotability
are more important than diﬀerences in the eﬀects of past speed of promotion
(as indicated by the relative standard deviations found in Table 3). More
precisely, the standard deviation of the intercept term (αPi ) is 0.60 while the
standard deviation of the slope (βPi ) is 0.12. In terms of the index function
(the propensity to be promoted), these numbers, coupled with the range of
the initial speed variable (an average of 0.37 with a standard deviation equal
to 0.21) will imply that diﬀerences in the intercept term have a much larger
explanatory power than diﬀerences in previous promotion histories.
5.1.2 Model without Education
Estimating a promotion model with schooling endogenous is beyond the scope
of this paper but we may at least investigate the robustness of the results
by re-estimating a version of the model in which schooling is ignored and
implicitly part of the unobservable terms αP
0i and αS0i. These estimates are
found in column 2 of Table 1. As is evident from the results presented in
column 2, estimating a model without conditioning on education leads to
quite similar results.
Overall, the model speciﬁcation is capable of replicating the main features
of the speciﬁcation in which schooling is assumed exogenous. For instance,
we still ﬁnd evidence that those who have been promoted at a faster rate in
the past (the initial condition) are also more likely to be promoted in the
future. This may be veriﬁed formally from the correlation found in Table 5
(equal to 0.9056). While there might be a slightly larger variability among the
24This may easily veriﬁed upon simulating the type speciﬁc promotion histories, given
the parameters of the model. This, and related issues, are discussed below.
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promotion intercepts (as seen by the standard deviation of the distribution in
Table 3) when schooling is ignored, we do not note any meaningful changes.
As well, the estimates also imply that diﬀerences in level constitute the prime
determinant of individual diﬀerences in promotion histories. While the sign
of the tenure variable has ﬂipped side (tenure is now positive), the estimates
is even smaller in absolute terms (the estimate is 0.0014).
The major change that deserves some discussion is found at the level
of the individual speciﬁc promotion dynamics variable. When schooling is
ignored, we are now able to identify four distinct slopes for the eﬀect of past
promotion. The major diﬀerence is that for type 1 (representing only 18%
of the population), the eﬀect of the speed of promotion is negative (-0.08).
The other type speciﬁc parameters are -0.0040 (type 2), 0.2481 (type 3) and
0.1940 (type 4). The population average parameter, 0.0975 (found Table 3),
is however still positive but is closer to 0. This decrease in the population
average is mirrored in the corresponding marginal eﬀect (to be discussed
below).
The negativity of the promotion dynamics parameter is interesting in it-
self and deserves some attention. Negative fast track eﬀects are, as far as we
know, never mentioned in the literature. For this reason, it may be tempt-
ing to restrict the parameter space and impose positivity. We chose not to
do so. Our reading of the fast track eﬀect is the following; if the speed of
promotion raises current and subsequent promotion probabilities, those who
have been promoted ﬁrst will build a comparative advantage in promotions.
In practice, negative fast track eﬀects may take the following forms. In a
world where individual abilities are eventually known by the ﬁrm and where
identical individuals achieve the same ﬁnal level, the realization of an ab-
normally high rate of early career promotions may simply be compensated
by a lower promotion rate later. Another related explanation could be the
incidence of promotions at a level that exceeds one’s level of competence. If
a signiﬁcant fraction of the population eventually reach their level of incom-
petence, and demotions are diﬃcult to implement, their subsequent rate of
promotion may obviously be negatively correlated with the speed of previ-
ous promotions. In personnel economics, this notion is sometimes referred
to as the “Peter Principle”.25 This feature of the promotion process may
also be explained statistically. In dynamic discrete panel data models, it
25The relevance of the Peter principle in economic models of promotions is discussed in
details in Lazear, forthcoming.
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is by deﬁnition impossible to identify those individuals who have reached a
maximum level (for whom the promotion probability falls to 0) from those
who face a positive probability but have simply not been promoted. Put
diﬀerently, it is impossible to estimate an individual speciﬁc maximum level
below which promotion probabilities are positive and above which it is equal
to 0. If the promotion process is bounded, the individual speciﬁc maximum
level would have to be made function of observed human capital as well as
unobserved heterogeneity, most likely correlated with the promotion proba-
bility intercept. Obviously, the identiﬁcation of two sources of unobserved
heterogeneity from individual series of promotion outcomes would be tenu-
ous.
To summarize, we retain the fact that, on average, structural fast track
eﬀects are qualitatively small, positive on average and are not a key deter-
minant of observed promotion histories. Our results has implications for the
literature on wages/earnings growth. If promotion process depicts serial cor-
relation, so should the wage growth process. Furthermore, after controlling
for persistent individual speciﬁc factors, the structural correlation between
current and past wage growth should be relatively small. As far as we know,
this issue is never investigated in the earnings dynamics literature. Up to
now, most of the researchers have investigated the level of serial correlation
in wages and ignored wage growth.
5.2 The Marginal Eﬀects
To shed light on the parameter estimates, the corresponding marginal eﬀects
are reported in Table 2. The marginal eﬀects are computed for each indi-
vidual and averaged over the entire sample. As noted before, the level of
statistical signiﬁcance of the parameters is high enough that we are not re-
ally concerned with the precision of the marginal eﬀects. Instead, we report
a standard deviation of the marginal eﬀects which illustrates the cross sec-
tional diﬀerences in the marginal eﬀects (for given parameter values). With
respect to accumulated schooling, we report all the marginal eﬀects (the ef-
fect of completing college, the eﬀect of obtaining 2 years beyond college as
well as the marginal eﬀect of going beyond 2 years after college) in refer-
ence to those who attended (or graduated from) high school. We do this
because high school graduates and high school drop outs constitute only a
small fraction of the population.
The estimates indicate that college completion increases annual promo-
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tion probabilities by 0.0195 while obtaining 18 years increases it by 0.0287.
Reaching the next schooling category (more than 18) increases it by 0.0266.
As a comparison, the marginal eﬀect of age is 0.0017 in the model with
schooling and 0.0015 in the model where it is treated as unobserved. As
conjectured before, the marginal eﬀects of tenure (-0.0003 in the model with
schooling and 0.0060 in the model without schooling) are found to be very
small. These estimates imply that, after conditioning on unobserved skills
explaining promotions, time spent in the ﬁrm or in the labor market is irrel-
evant.
In our model, the marginal eﬀects of past promotion speed depend on
types as well as on individual regressors. When computed at the average
value of the type speciﬁc slopes, which is equal to 0.20, the marginal ef-
fect for the model with schooling averages 0.0157. It is therefore compara-
ble, although somewhat smaller, to the marginal eﬀect associated to college
completion. In the model where education is ignored, the marginal eﬀect,
averaging 0.0089, is smaller and is characterized by a wider dispersion. It
appears that statistical inference about the role of past promotion histories
on future promotion outcomes is not hindered by the exogeneity assumption
of the education variable.
Finally as was made clear already from Table 1, diﬀerences in levels cor-
respond to the largest marginal eﬀects. They may easily be inferred from
table 6. On average, the promotion probabilities decrease between 0.03 and
0.05 as an executive reaches a higher level. This is obviously true in both
model speciﬁcations.
At this stage, we can therefore assert that diﬀerences in promotion out-
comes are explained mostly by diﬀerences in level and,to a lesser extent, by
individual diﬀerences in unobserved individual speciﬁc attributes (or perhaps
unobserved ﬁrm attributes). When compared in terms of their marginal ef-
fects, individual diﬀerences in past promotion histories are less important
than diﬀerences in education.
5.3 Decomposing the Index Function
In order to assess the relative importance of each variable (or group of vari-
ables), we simulated promotion histories from the parameters of Model 1 and
worked with the single index function explaining the promotion probability
propensity. Our objective is to evaluate the explanatory power of each vari-
able (or group of variables). Our measure of explanatory power is reported as
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a percentage variable. The percentages denote the loss in explanatory power
of the explained part of the index function regression for each group of vari-
ables. They are computed from the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of correlation
from the regression that includes all factors and a regression that excludes
only each particular variable or group of variables. The results are in Table
7.
As suggested by our previous analysis of the marginal eﬀects, diﬀerence
in promotion probabilities are explained primarily by diﬀerences in level. In
other words, dropping the level indicators reduce R2 by 0.46. Omitting the
individual speciﬁc promotion probability intercept terms reduced it by 0.14
while omitting human capital endowment variables (age, tenure and school-
ing) reduced it by 0.035. Finally, diﬀerences in past promotion histories,
as well as diﬀerences in the promotion dynamics slopes, are each found to
account for less than 1% of the total variation in the index function.
Before concluding that the human capital variables are not important, it
should be recognized that they are much more inﬂuential in estimating the
initial condition. The second column of Table 7 shows that age and schooling
explain 35% of the variation in the initial speed of promotion. They therefore
must either raise the level of entry or the rate of early promotion, or both.
However, since over the sampling period, we observe executives that are both
young and of low tenure and ﬁnd a relatively small causal eﬀect on promotion
probabilities, we suggest that age and education primarily inﬂuence the level
of entry.
Our results illustrate that the ﬁnding of “fast tracks” in the empirical
literature results almost purely from unobserved heterogeneity (in the pro-
motion probability intercept) among American executives. Serial correlation
in promotion histories may hardly be given a structural (causal) interpreta-
tion.
6 Interpreting Heterogeneity in Promotion Dy-
namics: The Role of Human Capital
In this section, we investigate the nature of population heterogeneity, already
documented above. To do this, we extend out econometric model to allow for
interaction terms between individual attributes and the speed of promotion
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variable. We pay a particular attention to two variables, education and
tenure. To achieve a high level of ﬂexibility, we preserve the same stochastic
speciﬁcation of the promotion dynamics parameters (4 types), which implies
that the individual speciﬁc slopes are expressed as
βSit = βS0i + βS2 ·Ni + βS3 · Educationi + βS4 · tenureit (11)
Note that estimation of this model speciﬁcation requires education to be
measured in years and that, given the time varying nature of tenure, the
slope will automatically vary with time (with tenure). While there might
exist more ﬂexible methods to allow for interactions (such as spline functions
allowing for the slope to diﬀer at all (or many) possible values of education
and tenure), we retain the standard interaction term in order to keep the
number of parameters at a manageable level and because our objective is
only to infer the sign of the derivative of the slope with respect to tenure and
education.
6.1 The Eﬀects of Education on Promotion Dynamics
As it was indicated before, our estimates point out to the fact that diﬀerences
in the individual speciﬁc intercept terms of the promotion probability index
function are negatively correlated with the individual speciﬁc parameters
measuring the eﬀect of speed of promotion. If more educated workers are
more promotable, it is therefore possible that their past promotion histories
are less important and that diﬀerences in education might account for a
portion of the cross-sectional diﬀerences in individual speciﬁc slopes. Within
a behavioral framework, this may be explained by the fact that, from the
perspective of the ﬁrm, uncertainty about individual abilities is decreasing
with education and that, in the event where past promotion histories are
used as a signal, the signiﬁcance of the signal is therefore decreasing with
schooling.
To preserve the compactness of the results, we present a summary of the
type speciﬁc slope parameters.26 These estimates are found in Table 8. As
conjectured before, the estimate for the education interaction term (β
3
) is
negative and equal to -0.0234. It indicates that, as individuals get more
schooling, the eﬀect of past promotion goes toward 0 (or negative numbers).
The individual speciﬁc slopes average to -0.0582 and the related marginal
26Other estimates are found in Belzil and Bognanno (2004).
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eﬀect is equal to -0.0062 (found in Table 9). These estimates indicate that,
on average, past promotions are not a really important determinant of sub-
sequent promotions.
6.2 The Eﬀects of Tenure on Promotion Dynamics
If past promotion histories are used as a signal by employers, it is also natural
to expect the eﬀect of past speed of promotion to decrease with tenure. This
decrease could reﬂect a simple information acquisition from the perspective
of the ﬁrm. This assertion is veriﬁed upon looking at the estimates of Table
8. The parameter estimate for the interaction term between tenure and speed
of promotion is also negative (-0.0093). Because the related marginal eﬀect
is not as strong as for schooling, the average slope is now positive (0.2014)
and the marginal eﬀect is 0.0221 (the highest value found so far).
At this stage, we may conclude that population heterogeneity in the ef-
fects of past promotion histories is inversely related to the human capital
accumulation process. In other words, the promotion process of more edu-
cated workers is less aﬀected by structural fast track eﬀects than those who
have less education and, as workers accumulate job speciﬁc human capital
(as indicated by tenure), the positive fast track eﬀect tends to vanish. Both
ﬁndings are consistent with the possibility that structural fast track eﬀects
are inversely related to the importance of information asymmetries (schooling
and tenure reduce the uncertainties about worker’s ability and motivation).
Accumulated schooling and tenure may reduced the risk associated with pro-
motion (from the perspective of the ﬁrm), and may therefore lead ﬁrms to
ignore past histories.
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Table 1- Parameter Estimates
Model 1 Model 2
Exogenous schooling Without Schooling
Parameter and Parameter and
(asymp. st-errors) (asymp. st-errors)
Initial Condition
Schooling
12 years or less -
13-15 years 0.5751 (0.0022) -
16 years 0.6018 (0.0013) -
17-18 years 0.6514 (0.0014) -
19 years or more 0.6811 (0.0018) -
age -0.0127 (0.0001) -0.0228 (0.0003)
αS
0type1 0.8839 (0.0035) 0.9234 (0.0043)
αS
0type2 0.3171 (0.0021) 0.3523 (0.0023)
αS
0type3 0.3203 (0.0022) 0.3220 (0.0020)
αS
0type4 0.3214 (0.0004) 0.3012 (0.0035)
σS 0.0762 (0.0021) 0.0923 (0.0006)
Promotion Probability
Schooling
12 years or less -
13-15 years 0.0147 (0.0004) -
16 years 0.2208 (0.0011) -
17-18 years 0.3074 (0.0005) -
19 years or more 0.2915 (0.0004) -
age 0.0172 (0.0018) 0.0105 (0.0019)
newcomer -0.0477 (0.0004) -0.1057 (0.0169)
tenure -0.0029 (0.0013) 0.0014 (0.0016)
ﬁrm size -0.0015 (0.0003) 0.0011 (0.0004)
ﬁrm proﬁts 0.0001 (0.0007) -0.0020 (0.0007)
∆ ﬁrm size 0.0001 (0.0012) 0.0001 (0.0019)
∆ ﬁrm proﬁts -0.0001 (0.0005) -0.0001 (0.0400)
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Table 1- continued
Parameter and Parameter and
(asymp. t-ratio) (asymp. t-ratio)
Promotion Speed
βS
0,type1 -0.0046 (0.0012) -0.0835 (0.0230)
βS
0,type2 0.2482 (0.0014) -0.0040 (0.0147)
βS
0,type3 0.3203 (0.0005) 0.2481 (0.0132)
βS
0,type4 0.1222 (0.0004) 0.1940 (0.0130)
level 7 -
level 6 -0.1509 (0.0006) -0.1305 (0.0204)
level 5 -0.5459 (0.0004) -0.5808 (0.0072)
level 4 -1.0579 (0.0020) -1.1686 (0.0135)
level 3 -1.8034 (0.0040) -1.8559 (0.0109)
level 2 -2.6500 (0.0030) -2.9491 (0.0252)
αP
0type1 -1.3496 (0.0025) -2.0652 (0.0515)
αP
0type2 -1.9081 (0.0006) -2.3039 (0.0270)
αP
0type3 -2.5648 (0.0011) -2.3784 (0.0376)
αP
0type4 -2.9332 (0.0009) -2.2587 (0.0427)
Type Probabilities
Prob type1 0.2276 (0.0070) 0.1812 (0.0145)
Prob type2 0.2604 (0.0033) 0.3514 (0.0967)
prob type3 0.2514 (0.0009) 0.2655 (0.0323)
Attrition
αS
2
(initial condition) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.0002)
αP
2
(prom. prob. intercept) -0.0040 (0.0007) -0.0082 (0.0080)
βS
2
(prom. prob. slope) 0.0123 (0.0005) 0.0067 (0.0012)
# of individuals 25000 25000
mean # of periods 4.6 4.6
mean log likelihood -0.302942 -0.398917
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Table 2
Some Marginal Eﬀects from Model 1
Model 1 Model 2
Estimate Estimate
(st-deviation) (st-deviation)
Individual Speciﬁc Variables
16 years of schooling 0.0195 -
(0.0114)
17-18 years of schooling 0.0287 -
(0.0165)
19 years of schooling or more 0.0266 -
(0.0154)
tenure -0.0003 0.0060
(0.0002) (0.0029)
age 0.0017 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0012)
Promotion dynamics
Speed of promotion 0.0157 0.0089
(0.0133) (0.0144)
Note: The marginal eﬀects (the eﬀect of completing college, the eﬀect
of obtaining 2 years beyond college as well as the marginal eﬀect of going
beyond 2 years after college) are in reference to those who have attended high
school. The marginal eﬀects are averaged over all individuals. The reported
standard deviations is a measure of cross-sectional dispersion in the marginal
eﬀects, given parameter estimates.
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Table 3
Unobserved heterogeneity: Means/St. Deviations
Model 1 Model 2
Mean (st. deviation) Mean (st. deviation)
αSi 0.3895 0.4105
(0.2913) (0.3011)
αPi -2.1884 -2.2798
(0.6051) (0.7025)
βPi 0.2014 0.0975
(0.1228) (0.0987)
Table 4
Unobserved Heterogeneity Correlations:
Model 1 (with schooling)
αSi αPi βPi
αSi 1.0000 0.9154 -0.8990
αPi - 1.0000 -0.8779
βPi - - 1.0000
Table 5
Unobserved Heterogeneity Correlations:
Model 2 (without schooling)
αSi αPi βPi
αSi 1.0000 0.9056 -0.7634
αPi - 1.0000 -0.7723
βPi - - 1.0000
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Table 6
Average Promotions Probabilities across Rank
in Model 1 and Model 2
average probability average probability
(standard deviation) (standard deviation)
Rank
level 7 0.2357 0.2223
(0.1062) (0.1097)
level 6 0.2128 0.2011
(0.0988) (0.1002)
level 5 0.1561 0.1438
(0.0778) (0.0822)
level 4 0.1000 0.0996
(0.0533) (0.0349)
level 3 0.0517 0.0612
(0.0290) (0.0300)
level 2 0.0230 0.0286
(0.0133) (0.0188)
All levels 0.1213 0.1192
(0.0833) (0.0766)
Note: The promotion probabilities are averaged over all individuals at a
particular rank. The reported standard deviations are a measure of cross-
sectional dispersion in the promotion probabilities, given the parameter es-
timates.
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Table 7
Variance Decomposition of the Index Function in Model 1:
The Loss in Explanatory Power for each Group of variables
(1) (2)
Promotion probability Initial Condition
Explanatory power Explanatory Power
Variables
Human Capital 3.5% 35%
(age, tenure, schooling)
Level in the Firm 46.3% -
Promotion Speed 0.5% -
Promotion prob. intercepts 14% -
Promotion prob. slopes 0.5% -
Initial condition intercept - 65%
Note: The percentages denote the loss in explanatory power of the ex-
plained part of the index function regression for each group of variables.
They are computed from the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of correlation from
the regression that includes all factor and a regression that excludes only each
particular group. The regression function for the initial condition includes
only schooling and age.
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Table 8
Models with Interactions:
Summary of the promotion dynamics parameters
(1) (2)
variable interacted education tenure
Parameters Parameters
(standard errors) (standard errors)
type probabilities
Prob type1 0.2034 (0.0037) 0.1956 (0.0047)
Prob type2 0.2532 (0.0055) 0.2743 (0.0054)
Prob type3 0.2412 (0.0067) 0.2498 (0.0037)
Promotion Speed
βS
0,type1 0.3853 (0.0056) 0.3196 (0.0070)
βS
0,type2 0.3415 (0.0004) 0.3330 (0.0040)
βS
0,type3 0.2558 (0.0040) 0.2551 (0.0004)
βS
0,type4 0.3354 (0.0033) 0.3363 (0.0006)
education ∗ speed -0.0234 (0.0002) -
tenure ∗ speed - -0.0093 (0.0003)
36
Table 9
Model with Interactions
Mean/St-deviations of the promotion dynamics parameters
and the marginal eﬀects
(1) (2)
variable interacted schooling tenure
Mean (βS
0,) -0.0582 0.2014
st.deviation (βS
0,) (0.0645) (0.1049)
Marginal Eﬀect -0.0062 0.0221
st-deviation (0.0078) (0.0153)
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated an empirical dynamic model of promotion
histories with endogenous initial conditions using a panel of American execu-
tives followed up to 8 years. Our model allows for promotion probabilities to
depend structurally on endogenous past promotion outcomes (as measured
by the average number of promotion transitions achieved at a particular point
in time) endogenously determined through the initial conditions, and on in-
dividual (observed and unobserved) endowments as well as time varying ﬁrm
speciﬁc variables. We can assert that our model is the most general and
most comprehensive empirical model of promotion dynamics ever estimated.
For instance, it has allowed us to distinguish between structural (causal) fast
tracks from spurious (non-causal) fast tracks.
Our results point to the complexity of the stochastic process which gov-
erns ﬁrm level transitions. We ﬁnd that among standard individual speciﬁc
human capital endowment variables (age, tenure and schooling), only school-
ing really matters. The stochastic process generating promotions may be
viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become smaller as an
individual moves up in the hierarchy and which are primarily explained by
unobserved (to the econometrician) individual (or ﬁrm) speciﬁc factors other
than measured human capital.
Our results have also allowed us to uncover the dynamic aspects of pro-
motion histories. While the theoretical literature reserves a central place for
the notion of a fast track, we ﬁnd that the stochastic process generating pro-
motions is only mildly positively correlated (structurally), on average, with
the speed of promotion achieved in the past. However, we ﬁnd the existence
of a relatively high cross-sectional dispersion in the eﬀect of past promo-
tion histories and we are able to provide an explanation for this relatively
high dispersion. In general, the magnitude of the individual speciﬁc eﬀect
of achieving a higher speed of promotion is inversely related to accumulated
human capital; that is it is negatively correlated with schooling and tenure.
We believe that these ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the sig-
naling aspect of past promotions is stronger for those who are less educated
and who are relatively new in a ﬁrm. Accumulated schooling and tenure may
reduce the risk associated with promotion (from the perspective of the ﬁrm),
and may therefore lead ﬁrms to ignore past histories. We also ﬁnd that a
negative correlation between current promotion and past speed of promotion
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cannot be ruled out of for a portion of the population, and we are able to
relate this ﬁnding to the famous “Peter Principle” (Lazear, forthcoming).
As stated in the introduction, personnel economics is a growing ﬁeld.
Empirical results obtained in a statistical framework where the endogeneity
of past promotion histories is suitably recognized are practically nonexistent.
At this stage, a lot of interesting empirical questions remain unanswered. In
particular, it would be important to investigate the relative importance of
human capital and endogenous promotions in explaining lifetime earnings.
As it stands now, the relationship between wage dynamics and future pro-
motions is not well understood. In light of recent work on the speciﬁcation
of Mincerian wage regressions (Belzil and Hansen, 2002), it would also be
interesting to measure the causal eﬀect of endogenous schooling on career
promotion outcomes as well as investigate the nature of serial correlation
in wage growth. We believe that our approach is a good starting point to
investigate these questions, as well as other related issues.
References
[1] Abowd, John, Kramarz, Francis and Margolies, David “High Wage
Workers and High-Wage Firms, Econometrica 67 (1999),2, 251-333.
[2] Alvarez, Javier, Browning Martin and Ejrnaes, Mette (2003) “Modeling
Income Processes with Lots of Heterogeneity” Working Paper, Copen-
hagen University
[3] Ariga, Kenn, Ohkusa, Yasushi and Brunello, Giorgio. “Fast Track: Is it
in the Genes? The Promotion Policy of a large Japanese Firm,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38 (1999): 385-402.
[4] Baker, George, Gibbs, Michael and Holmstrom, Bengt. ”Hierarchies and
Compensation: A Case Study,” European Economic Review, 37 (1993):
366-378.
[5] _____. ”The Wage Policy of a Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, CIX (1994 a): 881-919.
[6] _____. ”The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence From Per-
sonnel Data,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX (1994 b): 921-955.
39
[7] Belzil, Christian “Job Creation and Destruction, Worker Reallocation
and Wages, Journal of Labor Economics, vol.18 April 2000,183-203 .
[8] Belzil, Christian “Short Run and Long Run Dynamics in an Empirical
model of promotion” IZA Working Paper, 2003.
[9] Belzil, Christian and Hansen, Jörgen (2002) “Unobserved Ability and
the Return to Schooling”, Econometrica, vol 70, no 6, 575-591.
[10] Bernhardt, Dan. “Strategic Promotion and Compensation,” The Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 62, No. 2 (1995): pp 315-339.
[11] Bognanno, Michael “Corporate Tournaments” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, vol 19, No 2 (2001): pp 290-315.
[12] Cameron, Stephen and Heckman, James (2001) “The Dynamics of Ed-
ucational Attainments for Black, Hispanic, and White Males” Journal
of Political Economy, 109 (3), 455-499
[13] Cameron, Stephen and Heckman, James (1998) “Life Cycle Schooling
and Dynamic Selection Bias: Models and Evidence for Five Cohorts of
American Males” Journal of Political Economy, 106 (2), 262-333.
[14] Carmichael, Lorne. “Firm-Speciﬁc Human Capital and Promotion Lad-
ders,” Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1983): 251-258.
[15] Chamberlain, Gary, “Panel Data ” in Handbook of Econometrics, Ed.
by Zvi Griliches and M.D. Intrilligator, amsterdam, north holland.
[16] Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Salanie, Bernard and Valentin, Julie. “Early
Starters Versus Late Beginners,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107,
No. 4 (1999): pp 731-760.
[17] Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth Wolpin (1999) “Why youth Drop Out of
High School: The Impact of preferences, Opportunities and Abilities”
Econometrica, vol. 67, No. 6 (November), 1295-1339.
[18] Farber, Henry S. and Gibbons, Robert. “Learning andWage Dynamics,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, No. 4 (1996): pp 1007-
1047.
40
[19] Forbes, J. Benjamin and Piercy, James E. (1991). Corporate Mobility
and Paths to the Top. New York: Quorum Books.
[20] Gibbons, Robert and Waldman, Michael. “A Theory of Wage and Pro-
motion Dynamics Inside Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol.114, No. 4 (1999): pp 1321-1358.
[21] Gibbs, Michael. ”Incentive Compensation in a Corporate Hierarchy.”
Journal of Accounting and Economics, XIX (1995).
[22] Heckman, James (1981) “Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data” in
Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Economic Application, edited
by Charles Manski and Daniel McFadden, MIT Press.
[23] Heckman, James and Singer, Burton (1984) “A Method for Minimizing
the impact of distributional Assumptions in Econometric models for
Duration Data, Econometrica, 52 (2): pp 271-320.
[24] Keane, Michael P. and Wolpin, Kenneth (1997) ”The Career Decisions
of Young Men” Journal of Political Economy, 105 (3), 473-522.
[25] Howard, A. and Bray, D.W. (1988). Managerial Lives in Transition:
Advancing Age and Changing Times. New York: Guilford.
[26] Lazear, Edward, “Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Di-
rections” Journal of Labor Economics” vol 17, no 2, pp 199-236
[27] Lazear, Edward P. “The Job as a Concept,” in Performance Measure-
ment, Evaluation,and Incentives, ed. William J. Bruns, Jr. (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1992).
[28] Lazear, Edward P., and Rosen, Sherwin. ”Rank Order Tournaments as
an Optimum Labor Contract,” Journal of Political Economy, 89 (Octo-
ber 1981): 841 64.
[29] Macleod, Bentley and Macomson, James “Reputation and Hierarchy
in Dynamic Models of Employment” Journal of Political Economy, 96
(August 1988): 832-854.
[30] Magnac, Thierry. “Subsidized Training and Youth Employment: Distin-
guishing Unobserved Heterogeneity from State Dependence in Labour
Market Histories” The Economic Journal” vol 110 (466):pp 805-837.
41
[31] Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Robin, Jean-Marc, Equilibrium Wage Dis-
pesion with Heterogeneous Workers and Firms, Econometrica, vol 70
(2002), no 6, 2295-2350.
[32] Prendergast, Canice. “The Role of Promotion in Inducing Speciﬁc Hu-
man Capital Acquisition.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
108, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 523-534.
[33] Rosen, Sherwin. ”Prizes and Incentives In Elimination Tournaments,”
American Economic Review, 76 (September 1986): 701 16.
[34] Rosenbaum, James E. “Tournament Mobility: Career Patterns in a Cor-
poration.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 24 (1979), 220-241.
[35] Rosenbaum, James E. (1984). Career Mobility in a Corporate Hierarchy.
Orlando: Academic Press, Inc.
[36] Seltzer, Andrew and Merrett, David. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol.
18, No. 4. (Oct., 2000), pp. 573-613.
[37] Tuckel, P. and Siegel, K. “The Myth of the Migrant Manager.” Business
Horizons, 26 (1) (1983), 64-70.
[38] Useem, M. and Karabel, J. “Pathways to Top Corporate Management.”
American Sociological Review, 51 (1986), 184-200.
[39] Vroom, V. F. and MacCrimmon, K.R. “Toward a Stochastic Model of
Managerial Careers.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 13 (1968), 26-
46.
[40] Wooldridge, Jeﬀrey (2003) “Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions
Problem in Dynamic, Non-linear Panel Data Models with Unobserved
Heterogeneity” forthcoming in The Journal of Applied Econometrics
42
8 Data Appendix
Table A1
Some Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Dev.
Variables
Level in the ﬁrm
in year 1 4.30 1.27
in year 2 4.29 1.29
in year 3 4.18 1.31
in year 4 4.05 1.29
in year 5 3.97 1.31
in year 6 3.87 1.31
in year 7 3.71 1.27
in year 8 3.52 1.21
Fraction promoted
in year 2 0.11 -
in year 3 0.09 -
in year 4 0.08 -
in year 5 0.07 -
in year 6 0.09 -
in year 7 0.08 -
in year 8 0.05 -
Firm proﬁts/1,000,000 of 1980$
in year 1 130.9 268.1
in year 2 127.4 237.4
in year 3 106.9 231.8
in year 4 106.0 225.5
in year 5 116.5 224.8
in year 6 106.1 209.4
in year 7 120.4 209.7
in year 8 127.9 260.6
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Table A1- Continued
Mean Std Dev.
Variables
Firm size/1000
in year 1 33.51 40.44
in year 2 33.33 39.58
in year 3 31.73 37.49
in year 4 32.22 38.44
in year 5 32.99 39.96
in year 6 34.07 42.44
in year 7 32.35 40.27
in year 8 32.91 41.35
education (years) 16.37 1.87
age 46.13 8.68
tenure 13.28 10.30
fraction newcomer 0.04 0.19
age above 49.90 4.47
fraction newcomer above 0.21 0.17
promotion per individual (per year) 0.1066 0.2438
Initial Speed of promotion 0.3683 0.2111
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Table A2
Promotion Incidence by Level
in the ﬁrst 2 years of data
Level Number of Fraction Average Average
in the ﬁrm individuals promoted tenure age
1 316 - 21.1 55.8
2 1957 0.011 15.0 50.4
3 6480 0.043 12.9 47.4
4 10093 0.081 12.8 45.9
5 8201 0.150 13.1 45.1
6 4361 0.217 13.6 44.6
7 1482 0.266 14.7 44.6
8 369 0.360 14.6 43.6
9 159 0.333 15.1 43.7
10 52 0.385 15.1 41.2
11 12 0.417 18.8 44.1
All 33482 0.117 13.3 46.1
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